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Abstract 
 
This article explores ways in which ubuntu morality might be anchored in the community, the family, and in personhood. It 
draws on the main tenets of tribal critical race theory (TribalCrit), whose aim is to unmask, expose, and confront continued 
colonisation within educational contexts and societal structures. The article recognises that Africa is still largely a communal 
society, and that it is this communalism which defines the peoples' perception of self-interest, their freedom and their location 
in the social whole. The family is critical as the primary institution of formative moral development, the school of justice, and the 
medium for the concrete expression of communal values. The central argument of the article is that ubuntu - inclined 
communities and families are pivotal to the development of personhood given that persons are products of community. In most 
of Africa personhood is constituted by the interplay between the culturally objectified conception of persons, and the 
subjectively apprehended aspects of social life through which individuals express their subjectivity in opposition to or in 
conformity to the conventionally defined roles, rules, and regulations of the habitus. In the last instance the article seeks to 
insert ubuntu as an indigenous African epistemology in contemporary socio-political and cultural discourses.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In my previous contributions to the debate on ubuntu in the areas of African philosophy and philosophy of education in 
South Africa I mounted a defence of ubuntu against Penny Enslin & Kai Horsthemke’s (2004) doubts about its viability as 
a model for citizenship education in African democracies. I argued that ubuntu is a normative concept (a moral theory), a 
humane notion, and a potential public policy. 1Having mounted that defence [successfully, I hope], I subsequently 
published the sequel in which I lamented the shocking and horrifying incidents of moral indiscretion that appear to have 
become commonplace in South Africa. 2  These range from violent crime, premeditated murder, rape, assault, to 
homophobic attacks and police brutality. These incidents almost made me doubt my own faith in the worth of ubuntu that 
I had so strongly advocated in my publications. I thought hard and deep about how ubuntu might respond to these 
incidents of moral indiscretion. Eventually I offered my readers African traditional education and Basotho indigenous 
education as programmes we might draw on to address the development of the sort of personhood that is necessary for 
ubuntu moral dispositions. I justified my choice of Basotho indigenous education on the grounds that it is my own native 
education about which I can write uninhibitedly. I surmised that young people who are initiated into ubuntu morality have 
the potential to become citizens that are inclined to treating others with justice and fairness at all times.  
In this article I grapple with ubuntu morality and how it can be anchored in the community, the family, and in 
personhood. I shall ground ubuntu morality in the tenets of ‘tribal critical race theory’ (TribalCrit). Brayboy (2005, p.427) 
contends that TribalCrit “is rooted in the multiple, nuanced, and historically - and geographically-located epistemologies 
and ontologies found in Indigenous communities”. In my work on ubuntu to which I briefly referred above I sought to rebut 
attempts mythologise ubuntu and to denigrate its value (Letseka, 2012). Brayboy (2005, p.430) suggests that “much of 
what TribalCrit offers as an analytical lens is a new and more culturally nuanced way of examining the lives and 
experiences of tribal peoples since contact with Europeans over 500 years ago”. As I will later argue, taking a step back, 
                                                                            
1 See Letseka, M. (2012) “In defence of ubuntu”, Studies in Philosophy and Education, 31 (1), 47-60. 
2See Letseka, M. (2013) “Educating for ubuntu/botho: lessons from Basotho indigenous education”, Open Journal of Philosophy, 3 (2), 
337-344. 
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as it were, ‘returning to the source’ 3 , is to affirm the value of indigenous epistemologies and to insert them in 
contemporary socio-political and cultural discourses and paradigms.  
I now want to briefly clarify my understanding of some of the terms that I shall use in this article. Starting with ‘the 
family’: I must acknowledge from the outset that the notion of ‘the family’ is porous and constantly shifting. There is such 
a plurality of what it means that we can ill afford to offer a ‘one-size-fits-all’ notion of ‘the family’. Having said that, there is 
no doubt that ‘the family’ [however we conceive of it] is at the epicentre of the development and flourishing of ubuntu 
moral dispositions. ‘The family’ has been described as “one outstanding cultural value of the traditional African society” 
(Gyekye, 1997), a “microcosm of the wider society” (Mbiti, 1975), the “raison d’être of all social co-operation” (Ayisi, 
1992), and “the school of justice” (Okin, 1989). In this article I shall refer to ‘the family’ in its nucleus and its extended 
senses. I intend this to be more reflective of South Africa’s communities in which ‘the family’ is located. These can be 
deeply rural, proudly traditional and communal. Or they can be pretentiously suburban, urban and very cosmopolitan 
whist also still keen to retain some of the aspects that are traditional and communal.    
My use of the term ‘morality’ shall be premised on the assumption that “morality within Africa is that which evolves 
from the process of living and is grounded in the context of communal life” (Verhoerf & Michel, 1997, p.394). This 
assumption resonates with the views of Nigerian-born professor of philosophy at Wellesley College in Massachusetts, 
USA, Efeany Menkiti (2004, p.324), who argues that in Africa “morality demands a point of view best described as one of 
beingness-with-others”. As Ramose (2003b, p. 382) puts it, “the logic of ubuntu is towards-ness”. Thus in South Africa the 
saying, umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, or its Sotho variation, motho ke motho ka batho, whose English variation 
approximates “a person is a person through other persons”, is so pertinent to the African life of communal 
interdependence and ubuntu moral dispositions. My understanding of the term ‘disposition’ draws on the work of 
University of Illinois professor of critical thinking and philosophy of science Robert Ennis (1996, p.166), who defines a 
‘disposition’ as “a tendency to do something, given certain conditions”. In the context of this article that tendency would be 
an ubuntu conduct. Elsewhere I have acknowledged the temporal nature of morality (Letseka, 2013). Drawing on Neil 
Levy’s (2004, p. 41) work, I recognised that defining morality was no easy task. However, it is Levy’s contention that “a 
moral system must be devoted, largely if not wholly, to a concern for the welfare of other people”. It is his view that “a 
morality must systematise norms of justice and fairness and prescribe equal treatment for everyone” (Levy, 2004, p.44).   
The article is structured around five sections. I start with a brief sketching of the key tenets of TribalCrit. I shall 
argue that TribalCrit and other critical race theories (CRTs) help to unmask, expose, and confront continuing colonisation 
within educational contexts and societal structures. Second, I shall tease out the notion of ‘community’.  Africa is still a 
communal society, and it is this communalism which defines the peoples' perception of self-interest, their freedom and 
their location in the social whole (Ake, 1993). Ubuntu holds that community is essential to intersubjectivity, and that a 
person is incomplete unless he or she maintains an active connection with the society or culture of which he or she is a 
part. Thus in the African context ubuntu is grounded in a traditional African community where the formative moral 
development of children is honed. In the third section I shall delineate the notion of the family in its western conception as 
the ‘nucleus’ family, and in its African conception as the ‘extended’ family. I shall argue that the family is not only the 
microcosm of the wider society, but also a medium for the concrete expression of communal values. In the fourth section 
I shall sketch conceptions of personhood with a view to arguing that in the African context personhood is socially 
generated and constituted by the theories, practices, and institutions that a society may deem meaningful to its peculiar 
experiences. As Masolo (2012, p. 89) succinctly puts it, “personhood is intersubjectively constituted”. In the fifth and final 
section I shall provide some concluding remarks. I now turn to a brief sketching of the tenets of TribalCrit with a view to 
juxtaposing these with key assumptions of the discourse of ubuntu. 
 
Tribal Critical Race Theory (TribalCrit)  
 
TribalCrit was introduced by University of Utah scholar of Indigenous American Indian epistemologies Bryan Brayboy 
(2005). Brayboy (2005, p.441) contends that TribalCrit rooted in the multiple, nuanced, historically and geographically - 
located epistemologies and ontologies found in Indigenous communities (Brayboy, 2005, p.427). He highlights the 
following nine tenets of TribalCrit (Brayboy, 2005, pp. 429-30).  
• Colonisation is endemic to society. 
                                                                            
3The notion of ‘return to the source’ was made prominent by Guinea-Bissauan and Cape Verdean revolutionary leader Amilcar Cabral 
(1973, p. 61), who argues in his book Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral, that ‘return to the source’, or ‘cultural 
renaissance’ means, among other things, recognition that the masses of the indigenous people who live in the villages are the repository 
of society’s culture, and the only social sector who can preserve and build it up and make history. 
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• U.S. policies toward Indigenous peoples are rooted in imperialism, White supremacy, and a desire for material 
gain. 
• Indigenous peoples occupy a liminal space that accounts for both the political and racialised natures of our 
identities. 
• Indigenous peoples have a desire to obtain and forge tribal sovereignty, tribal autonomy, self-determination, 
and self-identification. 
• The concepts of culture, knowledge, and power take on new meaning when examined through an Indigenous 
lens. 
• Governmental policies and educational policies toward Indigenous peoples are intimately linked around the 
problematic goal of assimilation. 
• Tribal philosophies, beliefs, customs, traditions, and visions for the future are central to understanding the lived 
realities of Indigenous peoples, but they also illustrate the differences and adaptability among individuals and 
groups. 
• Stories are not separate from theory; they make up theory and are, therefore, real and legitimate sources of 
data and ways of being. 
• Theory and practice are connected in deep and explicit ways such that scholars must work towards social 
change. 
Brayboy’s (2005, p.430) argues that “the primary tenet of TribalCrit is the notion that colonisation is endemic to 
society”. By colonisation he means that “European American thought, knowledge, and power structures dominate 
present-day society in the United States”. He cites Battiste (2002, p.5), who writes that “Eurocentric thinkers dismissed 
Indigenous knowledge in the same way they dismissed any socio-political cultural life they did not understand: they found 
it to be unsystematic and incapable of meeting the productivity needs of the modern world”. I shall say more on 
Eurocentricism below. For now, suffices it to mention that Eurocentrism is a culturalist phenomenon that seeks to 
universalise Euro-American assumptions and historiographies. Writer (2008, p.3) notes that “although a significant role is 
played by racism, a primary tenet within TribalCrit is the endemic nature of colonisation and its processes in society”. She 
is convinced that TribalCrit offers “the possibility of unmasking, exposing, and confronting continued colonisation within 
educational contexts and societal structures, thus transforming those contexts and structures for Indigenous Peoples” 
(Writer, 2008, p.2). It is her contention that critical race theory (CRT) and TribalCrit are ontological and epistemological 
frameworks that construct multicultural education as social justice’ to function as a means to access and understand the 
‘story’ of colonisation of Indigenous Peoples; to understand how colonisation is continuously enacted upon Indigenous 
Peoples, and to change the enactment of colonisation (Writer, 2008, p.3). For Dana-Sacco (2010, pp. 64-65), TribalCrit 
focuses on “the endemic nature of colonisation; the marginalisation it creates; and how the dialogic relationship between 
Indigenous culture, knowledge, and power enables praxis on individual and tribal levels”. She defines praxis as “reflection 
and action directed at the structures to be transformed”. 
There are parallels between the ideas and intentions of the above proponents of TribalCrit and the ideas and 
intentions of the proponents of ubuntu, which took centre stage in South Africa in the early 1990s as a result of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (Letseka, 2013, 2012, 2000; Metz & Gaie, 2010; Metz, 2007; Broodryk, 2003; 
Ramose, 2003a, 2003b, 1999; Sindane & Liebenberg, 2000; Tutu, 1999; Sindane, 1994, Shutte, 1994). Let me briefly 
explain. One of the tenets of TribalCrit that Brayboy (2005) mentions is that “Indigenous peoples have a desire to obtain 
and forge tribal sovereignty, tribal autonomy, self-determination, and self-identification”. The need for tribal sovereignty, 
tribal autonomy, self-determination, and self-identification can be regarded as a response to colonisation and 
Eurocenticism. Egyptian Marxist economist Samir Amin (1989) contends that Eurocentrism is a culturalist phenomenon 
that assumes the existence of irreducibly distinct cultural variants that shape the historical paths of different peoples. It 
claims that imitation of expression of the Western model by all people is the only solution to the challenges of our time. 
Thus Eurocentrism implies a theory of world history and, departing from it, a global political project. Amin (1989, p.106) 
argues that Eurocentrism’s manifestations are expressed in the most varied of areas: day-to-day relationships between 
individuals, political formation and opinion, general view concerning society and culture, and social science. These 
expressions are sometimes violent, leading all the way to racism, and sometimes subtle. But Amin rejects Eurocentrism. 
He charges that Eurocentrism is unable to see anything other than the lives of those who are comfortably installed in the 
modern world. He finds parallels between Eurocentrism and Nazism, and argues that the latter is the extreme formulation 
of the thesis of Eurocentrism. 
Turkish-born historian and former professor of Duke University Arif Dirlik (2002, p.258) posits that Eurocentricism 
can be regarded as “a principle for reordering the world’s evidence and reorganising the past”. Since World War II 
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Eurocentricism has been the informing principle in the constructions of history, not just Euro-American historiographies, 
but in the spatial and temporal assumptions of dominant historiographies worldwide (Dirlik, 2002, p.260). In the same vein 
Howard University anthropologist S.O.Y. Keita (2002, p.287) argues that Eurocentrism universalised history in such a 
way that the world as we know it today has become “subject to racialised historiographies and epistemologies”. The 
histories emerging from the nineteenth century onwards, whether written by Europeans or not, were decidedly 
Eurocentric (Keita, 2002, p.288). And the reason for this is fairly simple. Euro-Americans conquered the world, renamed 
places, rearranged economies, societies, and politics, and drove to the margins pre-modern ways of knowing space, 
time, and many other things. Hence the need for TribalCrit and the reassertion of indigenous epistemologies such as 
ubuntu cannot be overemphasised.  
One of Brayboy’s (2005, p.434) tenets of TribalCrit is that “TribalCrit problematises the concepts of culture, 
knowledge, and power and offers alternative ways of understanding them through an Indigenous lens”. This way, 
Brayboy argues, “TribalCrit migrates away from western/European notions of culture, knowledge, and power and moves 
to notions that have been circulating among Indigenous peoples for thousands of years”. South African-born Central 
Michigan University scholar of indigenous epistemologies Ivy Goduka (2005, p.60) compellingly argues that indigenous 
ways of knowing are by no means “a romanticism and, a nostalgic yearning for the long gone past, or a movement to go 
back to the `caves' and `bushes.' Neither are they rigid understandings of culture as static, archaic, exclusionary, and 
frozen in space and time”. This is because “cultures are dynamic and adaptive, and have evolved over time to integrate 
other ways of knowing”. Indeed as Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye (1997, pp.217-218) points out, “no human 
culture is absolutely unchanging, totally refusing to take advantage of possible benefits that often accompany encounters 
with other cultures. Absolute changelessness is impossible and cannot be considered a necessary condition of any 
human society”. 
One of the key strengths of employing any CRT in one’s analysis of post-coloniality is that a CRT allows one to 
mediate the uses of overt or covert power and ideology in order to navigate dominant hegemonic spaces. Elsewhere we 
debated French philosopher Michel Foucault’s ‘discourse and power’ and I shall therefore not dwell on the issues here 
(Pitsoe & Letseka, 2012). Suffices it to mention though that for Foucault (1972, p. 49), discourses are not only about what 
can be said and thought, but also about who can speak, when, and with what authority. Discourses embody meaning and 
social relationships, they constitute both subjectivity and power relations; and are “practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak. In addition, discourses are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute 
them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention”. Saint Cloud State University sociologist Tracy Ore 
(2006, p.202) reminds us that “maintaining systems of inequality relies on a foundation constructed of several 
components. Central to this foundation is the presence of an ideology – a set of cultural values, beliefs, and attitudes that 
provide the basis for inequality and thus, in part, endorse and justify the interests of the dominant group”. In South Africa 
most of the attempts to denigrate and disparage ubuntu can be regarded as part of the Eurocentric paradigm referred to 
above whose aim is to reorder the world’s evidence, reorganise the past into racialised historiographies and 
epistemologies. One way of avoiding such reordering and reorganising is by drawing on paradigms such as TribalCrit and 
CRTs to unmask, expose, and confront racialised agendas.  
Another of Brayboy’s (2005) tenets of TribalCrit is that “stories make up theory and are, therefore, real and 
legitimate sources of data and ways of being”. Corroborating this particular tenet, I have made a case for the importance 
of ditĞomo-Sotho folk tales or legends to Basotho social philosophy (Letseka, 2013). The ditĞomo are orally passed down 
from one generation to the next and become part of the community’s tradition. I drew on David Coplan (1993, p. 92) who 
argues that like auriterary metaphors, ditĞomo are intended to startle untamed meanings from their burrows. They are full 
of surprises and attacks ranging from the uncanny to the fantastical, with mythical creatures, wild animals, and even 
wilder humans pursuing improbable stratagems. But at the heart of ditĞomo are home truths about the nature of humanity 
and society. 
Finally, Brayboy (2005) argues that tribal philosophies, beliefs, customs, traditions, and visions for the future are 
not only central to our understanding of the lived realities of Indigenous peoples, they also illustrate the differences and 
adaptability among individuals and groups. Juxtaposing the notion of ubuntu with the above expositions of TribalCrit 
raises fascinating socio-cultural dynamics. For instance, Ramose (2003a) argues that understood as be-ing human 
(humanness); a humane, respectful, and polite attitude towards others, “ubuntu is the root of African philosophy. The be-
ing of an African in the universe is inseparably anchored upon ubuntu” (Ramose 2003a, p.270). In what French 
philosopher Jean Paul Sartre (2003) calls being-with-others, in his book Being and Nothingness: An Essay on 
Phenomenological Ontology, we discover ourselves not in conflict with the other but in community with him. For Sartre 
(2003, p.435), the ‘we’ includes a plurality of subjectives which recognise one another as subjectivities. The ‘we’ is a 
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particular experience which is produced in special cases on the foundation of being-for-others in general. The being-for-
others precedes and founds the being-with-others (Sartre, 2003, p.436). Back to Ramose (2003a, p.271), it is his 
contention that ubuntu “is the wellspring flowing with African ontology and epistemology. If these latter are the basis of 
philosophy, then African philosophy has long been established in and through ubuntu”. He further argues that “in this 
sense, ubuntu is the basis of African philosophy”. It can therefore be reasonably inferred that a more nuanced 
understanding of indigenous epistemologies is critical to reasserting their underlying assumptions and principles against 
any attempts to disparage and negate their socio-cultural worth. I now turn to the place of ubuntu morality in communities. 
 
Communities and Ubuntu Morality  
 
Some thirteen (13) years ago I published a chapter titled “African philosophy and educational discourse”,4 in which I 
attempted to develop the conceptual tools that would allow me to continue theorising the notion of ubuntu to this day. A 
recapping of the key arguments of that chapter is now in order. I argued that ubuntu has normative implications in that it 
encapsulates moral norms and values such as ‘‘altruism, kindness, generosity, compassion, benevolence, courtesy, and 
respect and concern for others’’ (Letseka, 2000, p.180). I posited that “the underlying concern of ubuntu (humaneness) is 
with the welfare of others (Letseka, 2000, p.184). The reason for this is that ubuntu prescribes desirable and acceptable 
forms of human conduct in a particular community of people (Letseka, 2000, p.186). I challenged those working in the 
area of African philosophy of education to “clarify the normative aspects of education in the African context”, to pose 
fundamental questions and to reflect on “the fundamental aspects of the essence of ubuntu on human life, encapsulated 
by the notion of botho or ubuntu, and how this impacts on human conduct, human experience, and conceptions of the 
good life” (Letseka, 2000, p.190). I underscored that as a general rule, “we are batho or abantu (persons) because we 
live lives that are consistent with communally accepted and desirable ethical standards”. Ramose (2003b, p.380) 
endorses some of the sentiments raised in the chapter. He argues that “ubuntu as a concept and experience is linked 
epistemologically to umuntu [person]. On the basis of this link umuntu posits ubuntu as its basic normative category of 
ethics”.  
As an African, my engagement with the notion of ubuntu is grounded in understandings of a traditional African 
community where my formative moral development was honed. As Nigerian political economist Claude Ake (1993, p.243) 
reminds us, “Africa is still a communal society, and it is this communalism which defines the peoples' perception of self-
interest, their freedom and their location in the social whole”. This perception manifests in the enduring sense of 
communal interdependence. In the African context it is a truism that communality and interdependence are 
complimentary characteristic features of most cultures. Chachine (2008, p.74) argues that ubuntu “articulates a view of 
oneself in the realm of social interdependence”. That realm manifests in belonging to, and being grounded in one’s 
community. In the ubuntu conceptual scheme community is “central to the African understanding of person, where the 
individual is conceived of as attaining the idea of himself or herself in terms of his or her continuing engagement within 
the web of social relationships”. Thus ubuntu implies an interactive ethic in which our humanity is shaped by our 
interaction with others as co-dependent beings (McCluskey and Lephalala, 2010; Cornell and van Marle, 2005).  
Let me further amplify this idea of African communal interdependence. Libin (2003, p.126) contends that the 
philosophy of ubuntu holds that “community is essential to subjectivity. That is, a person is incomplete unless he or she 
maintains an active connection with the society or culture of which he or she is a part”. Menkiti (2004, p.326) argues that 
in the stated journey of the individual toward personhood “the community plays a vital role both as catalyst and as 
prescriber of norms. The idea is that in order to transform what was initially biologically given into full personhood, the 
community, of necessity, has to step in, since the individual, himself or herself, cannot carry through the transformation 
unassisted”. In this regard Kenyan theologian and philosopher John S. Mbiti (1972) is credited for giving prominence to 
the maxim: I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am. Put simply, “to ‘be’ is to belong” (Chachine, 2008, p. 
74). Mbiti (1989, p.106) contends that in the African communal life “the individual cannot exist alone except corporately. 
She owes her existence to other people, including those of past generations and her contemporaries”. Endorsing Mbiti’s 
maxim above Ghanaian-born American philosopher at Princeton University, USA, Kwame Anthony Appiah (2004, p.540) 
argues that “the African asks always not ‘who am I?’ but ‘who are we?’, and ‘my’ problem is not mine alone, but ‘ours’”. 
For Goduka (2000, p.71), this is in stark contrast to a Eurocentric view of humanity that is expressed by Rene Descartes 
in his maxim: “I think, therefore I am”, which is “a concept of self that is based on solipsism – a theory which asserts that 
only the self exists and can be proven to exist; and that the self is abstract and totally individually defined”. Ironically the 
                                                                            
4 See Letseka, M. (2000) “African philosophy and educational discourse”, in Phillip  Higgs., Zola Vakalisa, Tyobeka Mda, & N’Dri Assie-
Lumumba (eds.), African Voices in Education, Juta: Cape Town, pp.179-193. 
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above- sketched traditional African feature of communal interdependence resonates with the views and thoughts of some 
western liberal philosophers and cultural commentators. For instance, in his classic book, Four Essays on Liberty, British 
liberal philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1969, p.124) writes that “men are largely interdependent that no man is so completely 
private as never to obstruct the lives of others in any way”. While American educationist and philosopher John Dewey 
(1916, p.143) remarks that “what one is as a person is what one is as associated with others, in a free give and take 
intercourse”. In the same vein the opening lines of English poet John Donne’s famous poem ‘No Man is an Island’ 
encapsulate the communality and interdependence that this section is arguing:   
 
 “No man is an island, 
Entire of itself. 
Each is a piece of the continent, 
A part of the main”. 
 
For Verhoef & Michel (1997, p.395), “in all African societies an orientation exists towards a communal way of life, 
an understanding grounded in the belief that an individual is naturally connected to, as opposed to separated from, others 
and the universe”. Thus in view of the tacit knowledge that in Africa communities are constituted by families we cannot 
hope to theorise the notion of ‘the community’ without unpacking the deeper nuances of the notion of ‘the family’. In the 
next section I briefly highlight conceptions of the family from an African perspective - as the extended family, and from a 
western point of view - as the nucleus family. However, and notwithstanding these variations, there is consensus that the 
family is the primary institution of formative moral development for children. Consistent with Ake’s (1993) view above that 
Africa is still a communal society most of South Africa remains vastly rural and communal. And it is in these rural, 
communal and interdependent parts of the country where the ‘extended family’ thrives and flourishes. Even in families 
that have moved to the cities and become urban and cosmopolitan there will still be practices that have their roots in the 
rural and communal backgrounds. For instance, it is not unusual to witness a sacrificial ceremony in a suburban 
cosmopolitan area during which an African family appeals to the ancestors to be cleansed of perceived misfortune, or 
implores the ancestors for more blessings. I now briefly touch on the notion of family as the institution of formative ubuntu 
morality. 
 
The family and ubuntu morality  
 
My stance in this article is that ‘good moral conduct’ should emanate from the family. As Ramose (2003, p.385) notes, 
“the family is as old as humanity. Yet, what this means precisely differs from one culture to the other”. For example, on 
the one hand in most western cultures the ‘family’ is conceived of as a ‘nucleus’ family - confined to the couple and its 
offspring. On the other, in most African cultures the family is conceived of as the ‘extended’ family, which embodies “a 
broad spectrum of personal associations between great-grand parents, grandparents, fathers, mothers, uncles, aunts, 
children (sisters, brothers, cousins, nephews, and nieces), a host of maternal and paternal relatives, as well as the 
departed members” (Mbiti, 1975, p.176). The family has been described as an “outstanding cultural value of the 
traditional African society” (Gyekye, 1997), as “the school of justice” (Okin, 1989), and as “a microcosm of the wider 
society” (Mbiti, 1975). Let me elaborate. Gyekye (1997, pp.292-293) argues that the family is “the medium for the 
concrete and spontaneous expression of communal values such as love, caring, cohesion, solidarity, interdependence, 
mutual sympathy, responsibility and helpfulness”. Ghanaian anthropologist Eric Ayisi (1992, p.69) cogently sums this up 
in his observation that in Africa the “family forms the raison d’être of all social co-operation and responsibility”. 
In her book, Justice, Gender, and the Family, American liberal feminist political philosopher Susan Moller Okin 
(1989, p.17) describes the family ‘a school of justice’. She argues that it is in the family where “children can learn to 
develop the sense of justice they will require as citizens of a just society”. For Okin (1989, p.22), “the family is the primary 
institution of formative moral development. And the structure and practices of the family must parallel those of the larger 
society if the sense of justice is to be fostered and maintained”. Notice the similarity between Okin’s views here with 
Ayisi’s (1992) contention that family is ‘the microcosm of the wider society”. While Okin (1989, p.14) recognises that the 
family is “currently the linchpin of the gender structure”, and “must be just if we are to have a just society”, she is critical of 
the fact issues of gender justice within the family have been almost entirely ignored by traditional philosophers and 
political theorists. Okin (1989, p.22) concludes by issuing the most succinct statement on the family with which I couldn’t 
agree more:  
“A society that is committed to equal respect for all of its members, and to justice in social distributions of benefits 
and responsibilities, can neither neglect the family nor accept family structures and practices that violate these norms, as 
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do current gender-based structures and practices. It is essential that children who are to develop into adults with a strong 
sense of justice and commitment to just institutions spend their earliest and most formative years in an environment in 
which they are loved and nurtured, and in which principles of justice are abided by and respected”.  
However, I should mention that the notion of ‘the family’ is porous, contested and constantly shifting, and might not, 
therefore be spoken of, or written about as if it is homogenous, uncontested, and therefore unproblematic. For instance, 
in South Africa, as is probably the case elsewhere, there is a bourgeoning phenomenon of child-headed families due to 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic which has resulted in fathers and mothers dying prematurely, leaving behind elder children with 
the responsibility for looking after their younger siblings (Amoateng & Heaton, 2007; Skinner & Davids, 2006). There is 
also the enduring phenomenon of single parent families, whether it is a single divorced father, a single divorced mother, 
or a single widowed parent (Steyn & van Zyl, 2009). Then there are same-sex-headed families, whether by lesbians or 
gay men (Reddy, Sandfort & Rispel, 2009).   
Ore (2006, p.211) cautions that “as a primary social institution, the family is central to maintaining systems of 
oppression and privilege based on race, class, gender, and sexuality”. She argues that because the family “is so closely 
connected with other social institutions, such as the state and the economy, the structure of the family significantly 
influences and is influenced by the structure and actions of these institutions”. My own view is that these subtle nuances 
and undercurrents call for a more sober and calculated engagement with the notion of ‘the family’ and the sorts of 
persons that should populate it. To that end, in the penultimate section below I briefly explore notions of personhood that 
the above conceptions and descriptions of the family ought to develop, groom and release into the wider society. 
 
Personhood and Ubuntu Morality  
 
There is a symbiotic relationship between personhood, family and community. On the one hand Nigerian-born expert in 
Africana Studies at Birmingham University, New York, Nkiru Nzegwu (2004, p.422) argues that “personhood necessarily 
evolves in the nexus of family. The idea of an individual is intelligible only as a member of a family. In other words, a 
person cannot be an agent capable of self-defined and self-defining choices without family situatedness”. On the other 
hand, University of the West Indies scholar John Tunde Bewaji (2004, p.396) contends that “the wellspring of morality 
and ethics in African societies is the pursuit of a balance of individual, with communal wellbeing. It is not unusual to get 
the impression that African cultures extol the virtues of community, that moral obligations are primarily social rather than 
individual”. While in this article I have presented separate sections on the community, the family, and now on the notion of 
personhood, this was necessary for the purpose of mounting a structured argument. Conceptually, the three complement 
one another because they are mutually inclusive.   
Kenyan philosopher Dismas Masolo (2010) provides a useful articulation of personhood and morality in the African 
context in chapters four (4) and five (5) of his book Self and Community in a Changing World. Briefly, with respect to 
personhood Masolo (2010, p.154) operates from the premise that “persons are products of community”. He makes a case 
for “the biological constitution of humans as a necessary but not sufficient basis of personhood, because human beings 
require gradual socio-genic development to become persons” (Masolo, 2010, p.156). It is his contention that “personhood 
is constituted by the interplay between the culturally objectified perceptions of persons and the subjectively apprehended 
aspects of social life through which individuals express their subjectivity in opposition to or conformity to the 
conventionally defined roles, rules, and regulations of the habitus” (Masolo, 2010, p. 218). This then sets the stage for the 
creation of a link between personhood and morality. Masolo (2010, p.172) writes: “the metaphysics of personhood, the 
relational nature of the person sheds a new light on how we understand the foundations of morals”. This, he argues, 
“enables us to see the origin of moral principles as emanating not from the idea of an autonomous and transcendent mind 
that is endowed with the capability of ‘discovering’ correspondingly transcendental and objective laws and truths of 
conduct stacked away in the ‘objective world of norms’ but rather as emanating from the socially conditioned and located 
persons whose minds are the capacities of their bodily lives and experiences”. In this relational understanding of persons, 
moral principles “emerge when people understand the needs and interests of others at the same level as their own and 
when they understand the founding and reciprocal nature of the idea of freedom itself”. Masolo (2010, p.241) contends 
that “it is upon recognition of the basic danger that lurks around the rejection of interdependence between people and 
between individuals and community that the Swahili people say, for example, that ‘mkono mmoja haujikuni mgongon’ (a 
hand does not scratch its own back). The dialectic of mutual dependence that this saying alludes to is most evident in 
how persons and societies constitute each other”. 
Professor of Philosophy and Vice-Principal of Chancellor College at the University of Malawi, Didier Kaphagawani 
(2004, p.336) draws on Chichewa, a Bantu language of southern Africa to argue that munthu, a synonym of umuntu 
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[person] in Nguni languages, refers to the species of human beings and has universal applicability, and yet when this 
word is translated as ‘person’, it involves a socio-centric view of personhood, which varies from one culture to another 
and from one time to another due to the dynamic nature of culture and society. Kaphagawani’s (2004) analysis above 
links well with the view I advanced in my chapter contribution to the debate on ubuntu to which I referred in the opening 
lines of section two above. I argued then that motho or umuntu, from which linguistically botho or ubuntu is derived, can 
be used on a superficial level to refer to a person or an individual. But “when human conduct, captured in the botho or 
ubuntu (humanness) of a person, becomes an issue, a clear distinction between a person as an ethical person and as an 
ordinary individual becomes essential”. I argued that “motho or umuntu moves to a higher level, where he/she is endowed 
with desirable moral norms and virtues such as kindness, generosity, compassion, benevolence, and respect and 
concern for others” (Letseka, 2000, p.186). I concluded that it would be illogical for anyone with botho or ubuntu to 
respect and show concern for others and also have the inclination to rape because rape is an affront to and is 
inconsistent with ubuntu moral norms and virtues. 
  
Conclusion  
 
What I have attempted to do in this article is to explore ways in which ubuntu morality can be anchored in the community, 
the family, and in personhood. I sketched the main tenets of TribalCrit and argued that the latter helps to unmask, 
expose, and confront continued colonisation within educational contexts and societal structures. I showed that community 
is particularly important in South Africa given that Africa is still largely a communal society. This communalism defines the 
peoples' perception of self-interest, their freedom and their location in the social whole. I argued that ubuntu is a 
normative concept that encapsulates various moral norms such as ‘altruism’, ‘kindness’, ‘generosity’, ‘compassion’, 
‘benevolence’, ‘courtesy’, and ‘respect’ and concern for others. I showed that the expression umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, 
whose English translation approximates “a person is a person through other persons”, implies an interactive ethic in 
which our humanity is shaped by interaction with others as co-dependent beings. In this interaction the family plays a 
critical role as the primary institution of formative moral development, the school of justice, the medium for the concrete 
expression of communal values, and the raison d’être of all social co-operation and responsibility. I posited that ubuntu - 
inclined communities and families are critical to the development of personhood given that persons are products of 
community. Drawing on the work of Dismas Masolo (2010) I argued that personhood is constituted by the interplay 
between the culturally objectified conception of persons, and the subjectively apprehended aspects of social life through 
which individuals express their subjectivity in opposition to or in conformity to the conventionally defined roles, rules, and 
regulations of the habitus.       
 
References 
 
Ake, C. (1993) “The unique case of African democracy”, International Affairs, 69 (2), 239-244. 
Amin, S. (1989) Eurocentrism, Zed Books: London. 
Amoateng, A. Y., & Heaton, T. B. (2007) Families and Households in Post-apartheid South Africa: Socio-demographic Perspectives, 
HSRC Press: Cape Town. 
Appiah, K. A. (2004) “African Philosophy and African Literature”, in Kwasi Wiredu (ed) A Companion to African Philosophy, Blackwell 
Publishing: Malden, Massachusetts, pp.538-548. 
Ayisi E. O. (1992) An Introduction to the Study of African Culture, East African Education Publishers: Nairobi. 
Battiste, M. (2002) Indigenous Knowledge and Pedagogy in First Nations Education: A Literature Review with Recommendations, Indian 
and Northern Affairs Canada: Ottawa. 
Berlin, E. (1969) Four Essays on Liberty Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Bewaji, J. A. I. (2004) “Ethics and morality in Yoruba culture”, in Kwasi Wiredu (ed) A Companion to African Philosophy, Blackwell 
Publishing: Malden, Massachusetts, pp.396-403. 
Brayboy, B. M. J. (2005) “Towards a tribal critical theory in education”, Urban Review, 37 (5), 425-446. 
Broodryk, J. (2002) Ubuntu: Life Lessons from Africa, Ubuntu School of Philosophy: Pretoria. 
Cabral, A. (1973) Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral, Monthly Review: New York. 
Chachine, I. E. (2008) “Community, justice, and freedom: Liberalism, communitarianism, and African contributions to political ethics”, 
unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Theology, Studies in Faith and Ideologies, Uppsala University, Sweden. 
Cornell, D., & van Marle, K. (2005) “Exploring ubuntu: tentative reflections”, African Human Rights Law Journal, 5 (2): 195-220. 
Coplan, D. B. (1993) “History is eaten whole: consuming tropes in Sesotho auriture”, History and Theory, 32, 80-104 
Dana-Sacco, G. (2010) “The Indigenous Researcher as Individual and Collective: Building a Research Practice Ethic within the Context 
of Indigenous Languages”, American Indian Quarterly, 34 (1), 61-82. 
Dewey, J. (1916) Democracy and Education, Free Press: New York. 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
         MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 4 No 3 
September 2013 
 
 359 
Dirlik, A. (2002) “History without a centre: reflections on Eurocentrism”, in Eckhardt Fuchs & Benedikt Stuchtey (eds) Across Cultural 
Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective, Roman & Littlefield Publishers: New York. 
Ennis, R. H. (1996) “Critical thinking dispositions: their nature and accessibility”, Informal Logic, 18 (2 & 3), 165-182. 
Enslin, P., & Horsthemke, K. (2004) “Can ubuntu provide a model for citizenship education in African democracies?”, Comparative 
Education, 40, 545-558. 
Goduka, I. N. (2005) “Eziko: Sipheka sisophula. Nguni foundations for educating/researching for sustainable development”, South 
African Journal of Higher Education, 19 (3), 467-481. 
Goduka, I. N. (2000) “African/Indigenous philosophies: legitimising spiritually centred wisdom within academy”, in Phillip  Higgs., Zola 
Vakalisa, Tyobeka Mda, & N’Dri Assie-Lumumba (eds) African Voices in Education, Juta: Cape Town. 
Gyekye, K. (1997) Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical reflections on the African experience, Oxford University Press: Oxford.  
Kaphagawani, D. N. (2004) “African conceptions of a person: a critical survey”, in Kwasi Wiredu (ed) A Companion to African 
Philosophy, Blackwell Publishing: Malden, Massachusetts. 
Kant, E. (1947) The Moral Law or Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated by H. J. Patton, Hutchinson’s University Library: 
New York.  
Keita, M. (2002) “Africa and the construction of a grand narrative in world history”, in Eckhardt Fuchs & Benedikt Stuchtey (eds) Across 
Cultural Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective, Roman & Littlefield Publishers: New York.  
Letseka, M. (2013) “Educating for ubuntu/botho: lessons from Basotho indigenous education”, Open Journal of Philosophy, 3 (2), 337-
344. 
Letseka, M. (2012) “In defence of ubuntu”, Studies in Philosophy and Education, 31, 47-60. 
Letseka, M. (2000) “African philosophy and educational discourse”, in Phillip  Higgs., Zola Vakalisa, Tyobeka Mda, & N’Dri Assie-
Lumumba (eds.), African Voices in Education, Juta: Cape Town. 
Levy, N. (2004) What makes us moral: Crossing the boundaries of biology, One-world Publications: Oxford. 
Masolo, D. A. (2010) Self and Community in a Changing World, Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis. 
Mbiti, J. S. (1989) African Religions and Philosophy, Second Edition, Doubleday: New York. 
Mbiti, J. S. (1975) Introduction to African Religion, Heinemann: London. 
McCluskey, G., & Lephalala, M. (2010) “‘A person is a person because of others’: challenges to meanings of discipline in South African 
and UK schools”, Power and Education, 2 (1), 18-30. 
Menkiti, E. A. (2004) “On thee normative conception of a person”, in Kwasi Wiredu (ed) A Companion to Africa Philosophy, Blackwell 
Publishing: Malden, Massachusetts.  
Metz, T. (2007) “Towards an African moral theory”, Journal of Political Philosophy, 15(3), 321–341. 
Metz, T., & Gaie, J. B. R. (2010) “The African ethic of Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for research on morality”, Journal of Moral Education, 
39(3), 273–290. 
Ore, T. E. (2006) The Social Construction of Difference and Inequality: Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality, McGraw Hill: Boston. 
Pitsoe, V., & Letseka, M. (2012) “Foucault’s Discourse and Power: Implications for Instructionist Classroom Management”, Open Journal 
of Philosophy, 3 (1), 23-28. 
Ramose, M. B. (2010) “Learning inspired education”, Caribbean Journal of Philosophy, 2(1) 
Ramose, M. B. (2003a) “The philosophy of ubuntu and ubuntu as a philosophy”, in P. H. Coetzee & A. P. J. Roux (eds.) Philosophy from 
Africa: A text with Readings, Routledge: London. 
Ramose, M. B. (2003b) “The ethics of ubuntu”, in P. H. Coetzee & A. P. J. Roux (eds.) Philosophy from Africa: A text with Readings, 
Routledge: London. 
Ramose, M. B. (1999) African Philosophy through Ubuntu, Mond Books Publishers: Harare. 
Reddy, V., Sandfort, T., & Rispel, L. (2009) From Social Silence to Social Science: Same-sex Sexuality, HIV&AIDS and Gender in South 
Africa, HSRC Press: Cape Town. 
Shutte, A. (1994) Philosophy for Africa, UCT Press: Rondebosch. 
Sindane, J., & Liebenberg, I. (2000) “Reconstruction and the reciprocal other: The philosophy and practice of Ubuntu and democracy in 
African society”, Politeia, 19(3), 31 - 46. 
Sindane, J. (1994) Ubuntu and Nation Building, Ubuntu School of Philosophy: Pretoria. 
Skinner, D., & Davids, A. (2006) A Situational Analysis of Orphans and Vulnerable Children in Four Districts of South Africa, HSRC 
Press: Cape Town. 
Steyn, M., & van Zyl, M. 2009. The Prize and the Price: Shaping Sexualities in South Africa, HSRC Press: Cape Town.  
Tutu, D. (1999) No Future without Forgiveness, Rider: London. 
Verhoef, H., & Michel, C. (1997) “Studying morality within the African context: a model of moral analysis and construction”, Journal of 
Moral Education, 26 (4), 389-407. 
Writer, J. H. (2008) “Unmasking, Exposing, and Confronting: Critical Race Theory, Tribal Critical Race Theory and Multicultural 
Education”, International Journal of Multicultural Education, 10 (2), 1-15. 
 
  
